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Abstract—The General Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap
Channel (GGMAC-WT) and the Gaussian Two-Way Wire-Tap
Channel (GTW-WT) are considered. In the GGMAC-WT, multi-
ple users communicate with an intended receiver in the presence
of an eavesdropper who receives their signals through another
GMAC. In the GTW-WT, two users communicate with each other
over a common Gaussian channel, with an eavesdropper listening
through a GMAC. A secrecy measure that is suitable for this
multi-terminal environment is defined, and achievable secrecy
rate regions are found for both channels. For both cases, the
power allocations maximizing the achievable secrecy sum-rate are
determined. It is seen that the optimum policy may prevent some
terminals from transmission in order to preserve the secrecy of
the system. Inspired by this construct, a new scheme, cooperative
jamming, is proposed, where users who are prevented from
transmitting according to the secrecy sum-rate maximizing power
allocation policy “jam” the eavesdropper, thereby helping the
remaining users. This scheme is shown to increase the achievable
secrecy sum-rate. Overall, our results show that in multiple-
access scenarios, users can help each other to collectively achieve
positive secrecy rates. In other words, cooperation among users
can be invaluable for achieving secrecy for the system.
Index Terms—Secrecy Capacity, Gaussian Multiple Access
Channel, Gaussian Two-Way Channel, Wire-Tap Channel, Con-
fidential Messages
I. INTRODUCTION
GAUSSIAN multiple-access channels and two-way chan-nels are two of the earliest channels that were considered
in the literature. The multiple-access channel capacity region
was determined in [3], [4]. The two-way channel was initially
examined by Shannon, [5], where he found inner and outer
bounds for the general two-way channel, and determined the
capacity region for some special cases. In [6], it was shown
that the inner bound found by Shannon was not tight in
general. The capacity region of the Gaussian two-way channel
was found by Han in [7]. A related, somewhat more general
case called two-user channels was studied in [8], [9]. For a
comprehensive review of these channels, the reader is referred
to [10].
Mauscript received February 16, 2007; revised September 30, 2007. This
work has been supported by NSF grant CCF-0514813 “Multiuser Wireless
Security” and DARPA ITMANET Program grant W911NF-07-1-0028. This
work was presented in part in the 2006 Allerton Conference on Communi-
cations, Control, and Computing, [1], and 2007 International Symposium on
Information Theory, [2].
The authors are with the Department of Electrical Engineering at the Penn-
sylvania State University, University Park, PA 16802 (email: tekin@psu.edu,
yener@ee.psu.edu).
Digital Object Identifier
A rigorous analysis of information theoretic secrecy was
first given by Shannon in [11]. In this work, Shannon showed
that to achieve perfect secrecy in communications, which is
equivalent to providing no information to an enemy crypt-
analyst, the conditional probability of the cryptogram given
a message must be independent of the actual transmitted
message. In other words, the a posteriori probability of a
message must be equivalent to its a priori probability.
In [12], Wyner applied this concept to the discrete memo-
ryless channel. He defined the wire-tap channel, where there
is a wire-tapper who has access to a degraded version of the
intended receiver’s signal. Using the normalized conditional
entropy ∆ of the transmitted message given the received signal
at the wire-tapper as the secrecy measure, he found the region
of all possible (R,∆) pairs, and the existence of a secrecy
capacity, Cs, the rate up to which it is possible to limit the
rate of information transmitted to the wire-tapper to arbitrarily
small values.
In [13], it was shown that for Wyner’s wire-tap chan-
nel, it is possible to send several low-rate messages, each
completely protected from the wire-tapper individually, and
use the channel at close to capacity. However, if any of
the messages are available to the wire-tapper, the secrecy of
the rest may also be compromised. Reference [14] extended
Wyner’s results in [12] and Carleial and Hellman’s results in
[13] to Gaussian channels. The seminal work by Csisza´r and
Ko¨rner, [15], generalized Wyner’s results to “less noisy” and
“more capable” channels. Furthermore, it examined sending
common information to both the receiver and the wire-tapper,
while maintaining the secrecy of some private information
that is communicated to the intended receiver only. Reference
[16] suggested that the secrecy constraint developed by Wyner
needed to be strengthened, since it constrains the rate of
information leaked to the wire-tapper, rather than the total
information, and the information of interest might be in this
small amount. It was then shown that the results of [12], [15]
can be extended to “strong” secrecy constraints for discrete
channels, where the limit is on the total leaked information
rather than just the rate, with no loss in achievable rates, [16].
In the past two decades, common randomness has emerged
as a valuable resource for secret key generation, [17], [18]. In
[17], it was shown that the existence of a “public” feedback
channel can enable the two parties to be able to generate a
secret key even when the wire-tap capacity is zero. References
[19] and [20] examined the secret key capacity and common
randomness capacity, for several channels. These results also
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benefit from [16] to provide “strong” secret key capacities.
Maurer also examined the case of active adversaries, where
the wire-tapper has read/write access to the channel in [21]–
[23]. The secret key generation problem was investigated from
a multi-party point of view in [24] and [25]. Notably, Csisza´r
and Narayan considered the case of multiple terminals where
a number of terminals try to distill a secret key and a subset
of these terminals can act as helper terminals to the rest in
[26], [27].
Recently, several new models have emerged, examining se-
crecy for parallel channels [28], [29], relay channels [30], and
fading channels [31], [32]. Fading and parallel channels were
examined together in [33], [34]. Broadcast and interference
channels with confidential messages were considered in [35].
References [36], [37] examined the multiple access channel
with confidential messages where two transmitters try to keep
their messages secret from each other while communicating
with a common receiver. In [36], an achievable region was
found in general, and the capacity region was found for some
special cases. MIMO channels were considered in [38], [39].
In [1], [40]–[42], we investigated multiple access channels
where transmitters communicate with an intended receiver in
the presence of an external wire-tapper from whom the mes-
sages must be kept confidential. In [40]–[42], we considered
the case where the wire-tapper gets a degraded version of a
GMAC signal, and defined two separate secrecy measures ex-
tending Wyner’s measure to multi-user channels to reflect the
level of trust the network may have in each node. Achievable
rate regions were found for different secrecy constraints, and
it was shown that the secrecy sum-capacity can be achieved
using Gaussian inputs and stochastic encoders. In addition,
TDMA was shown to also achieve the secrecy sum-capacity.
In this paper, we consider the General Gaussian Multiple
Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT) and the Gaussian
Two-Way Wire-Tap Channel (GTW-WT), both of which are of
interest in wireless communications as they correspond to the
case where a single physical channel is utilized by multiple
transmitters, such as in an ad-hoc network. We consider an
external eavesdropper1 that receives the transmitters’ signals
through a general Gaussian multiple access channel (GGMAC)
in both system models. We utilize a suitable secrecy constraint
which is the normalized conditional entropy of the transmitted
secret messages given the eavesdropper’s signal, correspond-
ing to the “collective secrecy” constraints used in [42]. We
show that satisfying this constraint implies the secrecy of
the messages for all users. In both scenarios, transmitters
are assumed to have one secret and one open message to
transmit. This is different from [42] in that the secrecy rates
are not constrained to be at least a fixed portion of the overall
rates. We find an achievable secrecy rate region, where users
can communicate with arbitrarily small probability of error
with the intended receiver under perfect secrecy from the
eavesdropper, which corresponds to the result of [42] for the
degraded case. We note that, in accordance with the recent
literature, when we use the term perfect secrecy, we are
1Even though we faithfully follow Wyner’s terminology in naming the
channels, admittedly in wireless system models, eavesdropper is a more
appropriate term for the adversary.
referring to “weak” secrecy, where the rate of information
leaked to the adversary is limited. As such, this can be thought
of as “almost perfect secrecy”. We also find the sum-rate
maximizing power allocations for the general case, which is
more interesting from a practical point of view. It is seen
that as long as the users are not single-user decodable at
the eavesdropper, a secrecy-rate trade off is possible between
the users. Next, we show that a non-transmitting user can
help increase the secrecy capacity for a transmitting user
by effectively “jamming” the eavesdropper, and even enable
secret communications that would not be possible in a single-
user scenario. We term this new scheme cooperative jamming.
The GTW-WT is shown to be especially useful for secret
communications, as the multiple-access nature of the channel
hurts the eavesdropper without affecting the communication
rate. This is due to the fact that the transmitted messages
of each user essentially help hide the other user’s secret
messages, and reduce the extra randomness needed in wire-tap
channels to confuse the eavesdropper.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II
describes the system model for the GGMAC-WT and GTW-
WT and the problem statement. Section III describes the
general achievable rates for the GGMAC-WT and GTW-WT.
Sections IV and V give the sum-secrecy rate maximizing
power allocations, and the achievable rates with cooperative
jamming. Section VI gives our numerical results followed by
our conclusions and future work in Section VII.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
We consider K users communicating in the presence of an
eavesdropper who has the same capabilities. Each transmitter
k ∈ K , {1, . . . ,K} has two messages, W sk which is
secret and W ok which is open2, from two sets of equally
likely messages Wsk = {1, . . . ,Msk}, Wok = {1, . . . ,Mok}.
Let Wk = (W sk ,W ok ), Wk = Wsk × Wok , Mk = M skMok ,
WoS = {W ok }k∈S , and WsS = {W sk}k∈S . The messages
are encoded using (2nRk , n) codes into {X˜nk (Wk)}, where
Rk =
1
n
log2Mk =
1
n
log2M
s
k +
1
n
log2M
o
k = R
s
k +R
o
k. The
encoded messages {X˜k} = {X˜nk } are then transmitted. We
assume the channel parameters are universally known, and that
the eavesdropper also has knowledge of the codebooks and the
coding scheme. In other words, there is no shared secret. The
two channels we consider in this paper are described next.
A. The General Gaussian Multiple-Access Wire-Tap Channel
This is a scenario where the users communicate with a
common base station in the presence of an eavesdropper,
where both channels are modeled as Gaussian multiple-access
channels as shown in Figure 1. The intended receiver and
the wire-tapper receive Y˜ = Y˜ n and Z˜ = Z˜n, respectively.
The receiver decodes Y˜ to get an estimate of the transmitted
messages, WˆsK,WˆoK. We would like to communicate with the
receiver with arbitrarily low probability of error, while keeping
the wire-tapper (eavesdropper) ignorant of the secret messages,
2We would like to stress that open is not the same as public, i.e., we do not
impose a decodability constraint for the open messages at the eavesdropper.
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Fig. 1. The standardized GMAC-WT system model.
WsK. The signals at the intended receiver and the wire-tapper
are given by
Y˜ =
K∑
k=1
√
hMkX˜k + N˜M (1a)
Z˜ =
K∑
k=1
√
hWkX˜k + N˜W (1b)
where N˜M, N˜W are the AWGN, X˜k is the transmitted codeword
of user k, and hMk, hWk are the channel gains of user k to the
intended receiver (main channel, M), and the eavesdropper
(wire-tap channel, W), respectively. Each component of N˜M ∼
N (0, σ2M) and N˜W ∼ N (0, σ2W). We also assume the following
transmit power constraints:
1
n
n∑
i=1
X˜2ki ≤ ˜¯Pk, k = 1, . . . ,K. (2)
Similar to the scaling transformation to obtain the standard
form of the interference channel, [43], we can represent any
GMAC-WT by an equivalent standard form, [42]:
Y =
K∑
k=1
Xk + NM (3a)
Z =
K∑
k=1
√
hkXk + NW (3b)
where, for each k,
• the codewords are scaled to get Xk =
√
hM
k
σ2M
X˜k;
• The new power constraints are P¯k = h
M
k
σ2M
˜¯Pk;
• The wiretapper’s new channel gains are hk = h
W
kσ
2
M
hM
k
σ2W
;
• The noises are normalized to get NM = N˜Mσ2M and NW =
N˜W
σ2W
.
We can show that the eavesdropper gets a stochastically
degraded version of the receiver’s signal if h1 = . . . = hK ≡
h < 1. We considered this special case in [41], [42].
B. The Gaussian Two-Way Wire-Tap Channel
In this scenario, two transmitter/receiver pairs communi-
cate with each other over a common channel. Each receiver
k = 1, 2 gets Y˜k = Y˜ nk and the eavesdropper gets Z˜ = Z˜n.
Receiver k decodes Y˜k to get an estimate of the transmit-
ted messages of the other user. The users would like to
+
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Fig. 2. The standardized GTW-WT system model.
communicate the open and secret messages with arbitrarily
low probability of error, while maintaining secrecy of the
secret messages. The signals at the intended receiver and the
wiretapper are given by
Y˜1 = X˜1 +
√
hM2X˜2 + N˜1 (4a)
Y˜2 =
√
hM1X˜1 + X˜2 + N˜2 (4b)
Z˜ =
√
hW1X˜1 +
√
hW2X˜2 + N˜W (4c)
where N˜k ∼ N
(
0, σ2k
)
and N˜W ∼ N
(
0, σ2W
)
. We also assume
the same power constraints given in (2) (with K = 2), and
again use an equivalent standard form as illustrated in Figure
2:
Y1 =
√
α1X1 + X2 + N1 (5a)
Y2 = X1 +
√
α2X2 + N2 (5b)
Z =
√
h1X1 +
√
h2X2 + NW (5c)
where
• the codewords {X˜} are scaled to get X1 =
√
hM1
σ22
X˜1 and
X2 =
√
hM2
σ21
X˜2;
• the maximum powers are scaled to get P¯1 = h
M
1
σ22
˜¯P1 and
P¯2 =
hM2
σ21
˜¯P2;
• the transmitters’ new channel gains are given by α1 =
σ22
hM1 σ
2
1
and α2 = σ
2
1
hM2 σ
2
2
;
• the wiretapper’s new channel gains are given by h1 =
hW1 σ
2
2
hM1 σ
2
W
and h2 = h
W
2 σ
2
1
hM2 σ
2
W
;
• the noises are normalized by Nk = 1σ2
k
N˜k, k = 1, 2 and
NW =
1
σ2W
N˜W.
C. Preliminary Definitions
In this section, we present some useful preliminary defini-
tions including the secrecy constraint we will use. In particular,
the secrecy constraint we used is the “collective secrecy
constraint” we defined in [40], [42], and is suitable for the
multi-access nature of the systems of interest.
Definition 1 (Collective secrecy constraint): We use the
normalized joint conditional entropy of the transmitted mes-
sages given the eavesdropper’s received signal as our secrecy
constraint, i.e.,
∆S ,
H(WsS |Z)
H(WsS)
(6)
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for any set S ⊆ K of users. For perfect secrecy of all
transmitted secret messages, we would like
∆K =
H(WsK|Z)
H(WsK)
→ 1. (7)
Assume ∆K ≥ 1−ǫ for some arbitrarily small ǫ as required.
Then,
H(WsK|Z) ≥ H(WsK)− ǫH(WsK) (8)
H(WsS |Z) ≥ H(WsS) +H(WsSc |WsS)
− ǫH(WsK)−H(WsSc |WsS ,Z) (9)
≥ H(WsS)− ǫH(WsK) (10)
∆S ≥ 1− ǫ′ (11)
where ǫ′ , H(W
s
K
)
H(Ws
S
) ǫ → 0 as ǫ → 0. If H(WsS) = 0, then
we define ∆S = 1. Thus, the perfect secrecy of the system
implies the perfect secrecy of any group of users, guaranteeing
that when the system is secure, so is each individual user.
Definition 2 (Achievable rates): Let Rk = (Rsk, Rok). The
rate vector R = (R1, . . . ,RK) is said to be achievable if for
any given ǫ > 0 there exists a code of sufficient length n such
that
1
n
logM sk ≥ Rsk − ǫ, k = 1, . . . ,K (12a)
1
n
logMok ≥ Rok − ǫ, k = 1, . . . ,K (12b)
and
Pe =
1∏K
k=1Mk
∑
W∈×Kk=1Wk
P{Wˆ 6= W|W sent} ≤ ǫ (12c)
is the average probability of error. In addition, we need
∆K ≥ 1− ǫ (12d)
where ∆K denotes our secrecy constraint and is defined in
(7). We will call the set of all achievable rates, the secrecy-
capacity region, and denote it CMA for the GGMAC-WT, and
CTW for the GTW-WT, respectively.
Before we state our results, we also define the following
notation which will be used extensively in the rest of this
paper:
[ξ]
+
, max [ξ, 0] (13)
CMS(P) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈SPk
)
, S ⊆ K (14)
CWS(P) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈ShkPk
)
, S ⊆ K (15)
C˜WS(P) ,
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈ShkPk
1 +
∑
k∈SchkPk
)
, S ⊆ K (16)
P , {P : 0 ≤ Pk ≤ P¯k, ∀k} (17)
P¯ ,
{
P¯1, . . . , P¯K
} (18)
Lastly, we informally call the kth user strong if hk ≤ 1,
and weak if hk > 1. This is a way of indicating whether the
intended receiver or the wiretapper is at a more of an advantage
concerning that user, and is equivalent to stating whether the
single-user secrecy capacity of that user is positive or zero.
We later extend this concept to refer to users who can achieve
positive secrecy rates and those who cannot. In addition, we
will say that a user is single-user decodable if its rate is such
that it can be decoded by treating the other user as noise.
A user group S is single-user decodable by the eavesdropper
if CMS(P) ≤ C˜WS(P). Our achievable rates cannot guarantee
secrecy for such a group of users.
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE REGIONS
A. The General Gaussian Multiple Access Wire-Tap Channel
In this section, we present our main results for the GGMAC-
WT. We first define two separate regions and then give an
achievable region:
Definition 3 (GGMAC-WT Superposition Region): Let
Xk ∼ N (0, Pk) for all k. Then, the superposition region,
GMA-SUP, is given by
GMA-SUP(P) ,
{
R :∑
k∈S
(Rsk +R
o
k) ≤ I(XS ;Y |XSc), ∀S ⊆ K∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤ [I(XS ;Y |XSc)− I(XS ;Z)]+, ∀S ⊆ K
}
(19)
which can be written as
GMA-SUP(P) =
{
R :∑
k∈S
(Rsk+R
o
k) ≤
1
2
log
(
1+
∑
k∈SPk
)
, ∀S⊆K
∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
1
2
[
log
(
1+
∑
k∈S
Pk
)
− log
(
1+
∑
k∈S hkPk
1+
∑
k∈Sc hkPk
)]+
, ∀S⊆K
}
.
(20)
Definition 4 (GGMAC-WT TDMA Region): Let {αk} be
such that 0 ≤ αk ≤ 1 for all k and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. Let
Xk ∼ N (0, Pk/αk) for all k. Then, the TDMA region,
GMA-TDMA, is given by
GMA-TDMA(P,α) ,
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ αkI(Xk;Y |Xkc), ∀k∈K
Rsk ≤ αk[I(Xk;Y |Xkc)− I(Xk;Z|Xkc)]+, ∀k∈K
}
(21)
which is equivalent to
GMA-TDMA(P,α) =
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤
αk
2
log
(
1 +
Pk
αk
)
, ∀k∈K
Rsk ≤
αk
2
[
log
(
1+
Pk
αk
)
− log
(
1+
hkPk
αk
)]+
, ∀k∈K
}
.
(22)
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Remark 1: The superposition and TDMA regions can also
be written as follows:
GMA-SUP(P) =
{
R :∑
k∈S
(Rsk +R
o
k) ≤ CMS(P), ∀S ⊆ K
∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
[
CMS(P)− C˜WS(P)
]+
, ∀S ⊆ K
}
(23)
GMA-TDMA(P,α) =
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ αkCMk
(
P¯k
αk
)
, ∀k ∈ K
Rsk ≤ αk
[
CMk
(
P¯k
αk
)
−CWk
(
P¯k
αk
)]+
, ∀k ∈ K
}
(24)
in accordance with the definitions in (14)–(16).
Theorem 1: The rate region given below is achievable for
the GGMAC-WT:
GMA = convex closure of( ⋃
P∈P
GMA-SUP(P)
)⋃( ⋃
0≤α≤1
Σkαk=1
GMA-TDMA(P¯, α)
)
. (25)
Proof: We first show that the superposition encoding
rate region given in (20) for a fixed power allocation is
achievable. Consider the following coding scheme for rates
R ∈ GMA-SUP(P) for some P ∈ P :
Superposition Encoding Scheme: For each user k, consider
the following scheme:
1) Generate 3 codebooks Xsk,Xok and Xxk. Xsk consists of
M sk codewords, each component of which is drawn from
N (0, λskPk − ε). Codebook Xok has Mok codewords with
each component randomly drawn from N (0, λokPk − ε)
and Xxk has Mxk codewords with each component ran-
domly drawn from N (0, λxkPk − ε) where ε is an arbi-
trarily small number to ensure that the power constraints
on the codewords are satisfied with high probability
and λsk + λok + λxk = 1. Define Rxk = 1n logM
x
k and
M tk = M
s
kM
o
kM
x
k .
2) To transmit message Wk = (W sk ,W ok ) ∈ Wsk × Wok ,
user k finds the 2 codewords corresponding to compo-
nents of Wk and also uniformly chooses a codeword
W xk from Xxk . User k then adds all these codewords and
transmits the resulting codeword, Xk, so that it actually
transmits one of M tk codewords. Let Rtk = 1n logM
t
k =
Rok+R
s
k+R
x
k . Note that since all codewords are chosen
uniformly, user k essentially transmits one of MokMxk
codewords at random for each message W sk , and its
overall rate of transmission is Rtk.
Specifically, we choose the rates to satisfy∑
k∈S
(Rsk+R
o
k+R
x
k) ≤
1
2
log
(
1+
∑
k∈S
Pk
)
, ∀S ⊆ K (26)
∑
k∈S
(Rok+R
x
k) ≤
1
2
log
(
1+
∑
k∈S
hkPk
)
, ∀S⊆K,
with equality if S = K (27)
∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
1
2
[
log
(
1+
∑
k∈S
Pk
)
− log
(
1+
∑
k∈S hkPk
1+
∑
k∈Sc hkPk
)]+
, ∀S⊆K (28)
which we can also write as:∑
k∈S (R
s
k+R
o
k+R
x
k) ≤ CMS , ∀S⊆K (29)∑
k∈S (R
o
k+R
x
k) ≤ CWS , ∀S⊆K, with equality if S=K (30)∑
k∈SR
s
k ≤
[
CMS−C˜WS
]+
, ∀S⊆K. (31)
Note that if (31) is zero for a group of users, we cannot
achieve secrecy for those users. When S = K, if the sum-
capacity of the main channel is less than that of the eaves-
dropper channel, i.e., CMK ≤ CWK, secrecy is not possible for
the system. Assume this quantity is positive. To ensure that
we can mutually satisfy both (31), (30), we can reclassify
some open messages as secret. Clearly, if we can guarantee
secrecy for a larger set of messages, secrecy is achieved for
the original messages. From the first set of conditions in (25)
and the GMAC coding theorem, [44], with high probability
the receiver can decode the codewords with low probability
of error. To show the secrecy condition in (12), first note
that, the coding scheme described is equivalent to each user
k selecting one of M sk messages, and sending a uniformly
chosen codeword from among MokMxk codewords for each.
Define XΣ =
∑K
k=1
√
hkXk, and we have
H(WsK|Z) = H(WsK)− I(WsK;Z) (32)
= H(WsK)− I(WsK;Z) + I(WsK;Z|XΣ) (33)
= H(WsK)− h(Z) + h(Z|WsK)
+ h(Z|XΣ)− h(Z|WsK,XΣ) (34)
= H(WsK)− I(XΣ;Z) + I(XΣ;Z|WsK) (35)
where we used Ws → XΣ → Z, and thus we have
h(Z|Ws,XΣ) = h(Z|XΣ) to get (35). We will consider the
two terms individually. First, we have the trivial bound due to
channel capacity:
I(XΣ;Z) ≤ nCWK(P). (36)
Now write
I(XΣ;Z|WsK) = H(XΣ|WsK)−H(XΣ|WsK,Z). (37)
Since user k independently sends one of MokMxk codewords
equally likely for each secret message,
H(XΣ|WsK) = log
(
K∏
k=1
(MokM
x
k )
)
(38)
= n
(
K∑
k=1
(Rok +R
x
k)
)
(39)
= nCWK(P). (40)
We can also write
H(XΣ|WsK,Z) ≤ nδn (41)
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Fig. 3. GGMAC-WT achievable regions for different channel param-
eters, GMA(P1 = 4, P2 = 2).
where δn → 0 as n → ∞ since, with high probability, the
eavesdropper can decode XΣ given WsK due to (30) and code
generation. Using (36), (37), (40) and (41) in (35), we get
H(WsK|Z) ≥ H(WsK)− nCWK(P) + nCWK(P)− nδn (42)
= H(WsK)− nδn. (43)
Now, let us consider the TDMA region given in (22). This
region is obtained when users who can achieve single-user
secrecy use a single-user wire-tap code as in [14] in a TDMA
schedule, where the time-share of each user k is given by
0 ≤ αk ≤ 1 and
∑K
k=1 αk = 1. A transmitter k who can
achieve secrecy, i.e., having hk < 1, tranmits for αk portion
of the time when all other users are silent, using P¯k
αk
power,
satisfying its average power constraint over the TDMA time-
frame. This approach was used in [42] to achieve secrecy
sum-capacity for individual constraints. When the channel is
degraded, i.e., hk = h for all k ∈ K, then for collective
constraints the TDMA region is seen to be a subset of the
superposition region. However, this is not necessarily true for
the general case, and by time-sharing between the two schemes
we can generally achieve a larger achievable region, given in
(25).
We remark that it is possible to further divide the “open”
messages to get more sets of “private” messages which are also
perfectly secret, i.e., if we let Wok = W´sk × W´ok , ∀k, then as
long as we impose the same restrictions on R´s as Rs, we can
achieve perfect secrecy of W´s, as in [14]. However, this does
not mean that we have perfect secrecy at channel capacity, as
the secrecy sub-codes carry information about each other.
Observe that even for K = 2 users, a rate point in this
region is four dimensional, and hence cannot be accurately
drawn. We can instead focus on the secrecy rate region, the
region of all achievable Rs. The sub-regions GMA-SUP,GMA-TDMA
are shown for different channel gains in Figure 3 for fixed
transmit powers, and K = 2 users. Figure 4 represents how
these regions change with different transmit powers when
the channel gains are fixed. For the case shown, we need
the convex hull operation, as the achievable region is a
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GMA(4,4)
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Fig. 4. GGMAC-WT achievable secrecy region when P¯1 = 4, P¯2 =
4, h1 = .1, h2 = .3.
combination of different superposition and TDMA regions.
Note also that the main extra condition for the superposition
region is on the total extra randomness added. As a result,
it is possible for “stronger” users to help “weak” users by
contributing more to the necessary extra number of codewords,
which is the sum-capacity of the eavesdropper. Such a weak
user only has to make sure that it is not single-user decodable,
provided the stronger users are willing to sacrifice some of
their own rate and generate more superfluous codewords. In
other words, we see that users in a set S are further protected
from the eavesdropper by the fact that users in set Sc are also
undecodable, compared to the single-user case. The TDMA
region, on the other hand, does not allow users to help each
other this way. As such, only users whose channel gains allow
them to achieve secrecy on their own are allowed to transmit.
For the special degraded case of h1 = . . . = hK , h ≤ 1,
the perfect secrecy rate region for Rsk becomes the region
given by [42, Theorem 1] for δ = 1. We also observe that
even though there is a limit on the secrecy sum-rate achieved
by our scheme, it is possible to send open messages to the
intended receiver at rates such that the sum of the secrecy
rate and open rate for all users is in the capacity region of the
MAC channel to the intended receiver. Even though we cannot
send at capacity with secrecy, the codewords used to confuse
the eavesdropper may be used to communicate meaningful
information to the intended receiver.
B. The Gaussian Two-Way Wire-Tap Channel
In this section, we present an achievable region for the
GTW-WT using a superposition coding similar to that used
to achieve the region GMA-SUP for the GGMAC-WT. We first
define
Definition 5 (GTW-WT Superposition region, GTW(P)): Let
Xk ∼ N (0, Pk). Then, the GTW-WT superposition region,
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Fig. 5. GTW-WT achievable regions for different channel parameters,
G
TW(P1 = 4, P2 = 2).
GTW(P), is given by
GTW(P) =
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ I(Xk;Y |Xkc), k = 1, 2∑
k∈S
Rsk≤
[∑
k∈S
I(Xk;Y |Xkc)−I(XK;Z)
]+
, ∀S⊆K
}
(44)
which can be written as
GTW(P) =
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤
1
2
log (1+Pk) , k = 1, 2∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
1
2
[∑
k∈S
log (1+Pk)
− log
(
1+
∑
k∈S Pk
1+
∑
k∈Sc Pk
)]+
, ∀S⊆K
}
. (45)
Remark 2: We can also write this region more compactly
as the following:
GTW(P) =
{
R :
Rsk +R
o
k ≤ CMk (P), k = 1, 2∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
[∑
k∈S
CMk (P) − C˜WS(P)
]+
, ∀S⊆K
}
. (46)
Theorem 2: The rate region given below is achievable for
the GTW-WT:
convex closure of
⋃
P∈P
GTW(P). (47)
Proof: The proof is very similar to the proof of Theorem
1. We use the same coding scheme as Theorem 1, the main
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Fig. 6. GTW-WT achievable secrecy region when P¯1 = 4, P¯2 =
2, h1 = .3, h2 = .7.
difference is that we choose the rates to satisfy
Rsk +R
o
k +R
x
k ≤
1
2
log (1 + Pk) , k = 1, 2 (48)∑
k∈S
(Rok +R
x
k) ≤
1
2
log
(
1+
∑
k∈S
hkPk
)
, ∀S⊆K
with equality if S = K (49)∑
k∈S
Rsk ≤
1
2
[∑
k∈S
log (1 + Pk)
− log
(
1+
∑
k∈S Pk
1+
∑
k∈Sc Pk
)]+
, ∀S⊆K (50)
or equivalently
Rsk+R
o
k+R
x
k ≤ CMk , k = 1, 2 (51)∑
k∈S (R
o
k+R
x
k) ≤ CWS , ∀S⊆K, with equality if S=K (52)∑
k∈SR
s
k ≤
[∑
k∈SC
M
k − CWS
]+
, ∀S ⊆ K. (53)
assuming (53) is positive. The decodability of WsK from
Y1,Y2 comes from (51) and the capacity region of the
Gaussian Two-Way Channel [7]. This gives the first set of
terms in the achievable region. The key here is that since each
transmitter knows its own codeword, it can subtract its self-
interference from the received signal and get a clear channel.
Therefore, the Gaussian two-way channel decomposes into
two parallel channels.
The second group of terms in (45), resulting from the
secrecy constraint, can be shown the same way as the proof
of Theorem 1, since Z has the same form for both channels.
In other words, as far as the eavesdropper is concerned, the
channel is still a GMAC with K = 2 users. As such, we
need to send CWK extra codewords in total, which need to be
shared by the two-terminals provided they are not single-user
decodable.
For different channel gains, the region of all Rs satisfying
(45) is shown in Figure 5. Since we require four dimensions
for an accurate depiction of the complete rate region, we only
focus on our main interest, i.e., the secrecy rate region. Figure
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6 shows the achievable secrecy rate region as a function of
transmit powers. We note that higher powers always result in
a larger region. We indicate the constraint on the overall rates,
corresponding to the capacity region of the Gaussian Two-Way
Channel, by the dotted line. Note that the secrecy region has
a structure similar to the GGMAC-WT with K = 2. As far as
the eavesdropper is concerned, there is no difference between
the two channels. However, since the main channel between
users decomposes into two parallel channels, higher rates can
be achieved between the legitimate terminals (users). Thus, in
effect, each user’s transmitted codewords act as a secret key
for the other user’s transmitted codewords, requiring fewer
extraneous codewords overall to confuse the eavesdropper,
and a larger secrecy region. We note that a user may either
achieve secrecy or not, depending on whether it is single-
user decodable or not. As a result, TDMA does not enlarge
the region, since each user can at least achieve their single-
user secrecy rates. To see this, note that the constraint on the
secrecy sum-rate can be written as:
log(1 + P1) + log(1 + P2)− log(1 + h1P1 + h2P2)
= log(1 + P1)− log(1 + h1P1)
+ log(1 + P2)− log
(
1 +
h2P2
1 + h1P1
)
(54)
≥ log(1 + P1)− log(1 + h1P1)
+ log(1 + P2)− log(1 + h2P2) (55)
so that transmitting in the two-way channel always provides
an advantage over the single-user channels.
IV. MAXIMIZATION OF SUM RATE
The achievable regions given in Theorems 1 and 2 depend
on the transmit powers. We are, thus, naturally interested
in the power allocation P∗ that would maximize the total
secrecy sum-rate. Recall that the standardized channel gain
for user k is hk = h
W
kσ
2
M
hM
k
σ2W
, and that the higher hk is, the
better the corresponding eavesdropper channel. Without loss of
generality, assume that users are ordered in terms of increasing
standardized eavesdropper channel gains, i.e., h1 ≤ . . . ≤ hK .
Note that, we only need to concern ourselves with the case
h1 < . . . < hK , since we can combine users with the
same channel gains into one super-user. We can then split the
resulting optimum power allocation for a super-user among
the actual constituting users in any way we choose, since they
would all result in the same sum-rate. In addition, from a
physical point of view, assuming that the channel parameters
are drawn according to a continuous distribution and then
fixed, the probability that two users would have the same exact
standardized channel gain is zero.
A. GGMAC-WT
We first examine the superposition region given in (20). The
secrecy sum-rate achievable with superposition coding for the
GGMAC-WT was given in Theorem 1 as
RMA-SUPsum =
1
2
[
log
(
1+
K∑
k=1
Pk
)
− log
(
1+
K∑
k=1
hkPk
)]+
(56)
and we would like to find the power allocation that maximizes
this quantity. Stated formally, we are interested in the transmit
powers that solve the following optimization problem:
max
P∈P
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
∑K
k=1Pk
)
− log
(
1 +
∑K
k=1hkPk
)]
= min
P∈P
1
2
log φK(P) (57)
≡ min
P∈P
φK(P) (58)
where
φS(P) ,
1 +
∑
k∈S hkPk
1 +
∑
k∈S Pk
, S ⊆ K (59)
and S = K yields (58). In obtaining (58), we simply used the
monotonicity of the log function. The solution to this problem
is given below:
Theorem 3: The secrecy sum-rate maximizing power allo-
cation for GMA-SUP satisfies P ∗k = P¯k if k ≤ T and P ∗k = 0 is
k > T where T ∈ {0, . . . ,K} is some limiting user satisfying
hT <
1 +
∑l
k=0 hkP¯k
1 +
∑l
k=0 P¯k
≤ hT+1 (60)
and we define h0 , 0, P¯0 , 0. Note that this allocation shows
that only a subset of the strong users must be transmitting.
Proof: We start with writing the Lagrangian to be mini-
mized:
L(P,µ) = φK(P) −
K∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
K∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − P¯k) (61)
Equating the derivative of the Lagrangian to zero, we get
∂L(P∗,µ)
∂P ∗j
= φ˙(j)K (P
∗)− µ1j + µ2j = 0 (62)
where we define
φ˙(j)S (P) ,
hj − φS(P)
1 +
∑
k∈S Pk
(63)
for any set S ⊆ K.
It is easy to see that if hj > φK(P∗), then µ1j > 0, and we
have P ∗j = P¯j . If hj < φK(P∗), then we similarly find that
P ∗j = 0. Finally, if hj = φK(P∗), then we also have
hj =
1 +
∑
k∈K\j hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈K\j hkP
∗
k
(64)
and φK(P∗) = φK\j(P∗) does not depend on Pj , so we can
set P ∗j = 0 with no effect on the secrecy sum-rate. Thus,
we have P ∗j = P¯j if hj < φK(P∗), and P ∗j = 0 if hj ≥
φK(P
∗). Then, the optimal set of transmitters is of the form
T = {1, . . . , T} since if a user T is transmitting, all users
such that hk < hT must also be transmitting. We also note
that φK(P∗) = φT (P¯). Let T be the last user satisfying this
property, i.e. hT < φT (P¯) and hT+1 ≥ φT ∪{T+1}(P¯). Note
that
hT<
1+
∑T
k=1 hkP¯k
1+
∑T
k=1 P¯k
=
1+
∑T−1
k=1 hkP¯k+hT P¯T
1+
∑T−1
k=1 P¯k+P¯T
(65)
hT−1 < hT <
1 +
∑T−1
k=1 hkP¯k
1 +
∑T−1
k=1 P¯k
= φT \{T}(P¯). (66)
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In other words, all sets S = {1, . . . , S} for S ≤ T also
satisfy this property, and are viable candidates for the optimal
set of transmitting users. Therefore, we can claim that T is
the optimum set of transmitting users, since from above we
can iteratively see that φT (P¯) < φS(P¯) for all S < T .
Note that, for the special case of K = 2 users, the optimum
power allocation is
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 )=


(P¯1, P¯2), if h1 < 1, h2 < 1+h1P¯11+P¯1
(P¯1, 0), if h1 < 1, h2 ≥ 1+h1P¯11+P¯1
(0, 0), otherwise
(67)
We also need to consider the TDMA region. In this case,
the maximum achievable secrecy sum-rate is:
max
0≤α≤1
Σkαk=1
K∑
k=1
αk
2
[
log
(
1 +
P¯k
αk
)
− log
(
1 +
hkP¯k
αk
)]
. (68)
This is a simple complex optimization problem that can
easily be solved numerically. For the degraded case, we can
obtain a closed form solution: αk = P¯k∑
k
P¯k
as in [42]. In
general, we cannot obtain such a solution. However, it is trivial
to note that users with hk ≥ 1 should not be transmitting in
this scheme. The secrecy sum-rate is then the maximum of
the solutions given by the superposition and TDMA regions.
B. GTW-WT
Now, we will examine the power allocation that maximizes
the secrecy sum-rate given in Theorem 2 as
RTWsum=
1
2
[
log (1+P1)+log (1+P2)−log (1+h1P1+h2P2)
]+
.
(69)
This problem is formally stated below:
max
P∈P
1
2
[log(1+P1)+ log(1+P2)− log(1+h1P1+h2P2)]
≡ min
P∈P
ψK(P) (70)
where
ψS(P) ,
1 +
∑
k∈S hkPk∏
k∈S(1 + Pk)
(71)
and S = K yields (70). The optimum power allocation is
stated below:
Theorem 4: The secrecy sum-rate maximizing power allo-
cation for the GTW-WT is given by
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 )=


(P¯1, P¯2), if h1≤1+h2P¯2, h2<1+h1P¯1
(P¯1, 0), if h1<1, h2≥1+h1P¯1
(0, 0), otherwise
(72)
Proof: The Lagrangian is,
L(P,µ) = ψK(P) −
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − P¯k). (73)
Equating the derivative of the Lagrangian to zero for user
j, we get
∂L(P∗,µ)
∂P ∗j
= ψ˙(j)K (P
∗)− µ1j + µ2j = 0 (74)
where
ψ˙(j)K (P) ,
hj −
1+
∑
k∈K
hkPk
1+Pj∏
k∈K(1 + Pk)
. (75)
An argument similar to the one for the GGMAC-WT
establishes that if hj >
(
1 +
∑
k∈K hkPk
)
/ (1 + Pj), or
equivalently if hj > 1 + hjcP ∗jc , then P ∗j = 0. When equality
is satisfied, then ψ˙(j)K (P) = 0 regardless of Pj , and as such
ψK(P) can be seen to not depend on Pj . To conserve power,
we again set Pj = 0 in this case. On the other hand, if
hj <
(
1 +
∑
k∈K hkPk
)
/ (1 + Pj), then P ∗j = P¯j .
Consider user 1. If P ∗1 = 0, and P ∗2 > 0, this implies
that h2 < 1. Since h1 ≤ h2 < 1, we cannot have P ∗1 = 0.
As a consequence of this contradiction, we see that P ∗2 = 0
whenever P ∗1 = 0.
Assume P ∗1 = P¯1, and consider the two alternatives for
P ∗2 . We will have P ∗2 = 0 if h2 ≥ 1 + h1P¯1; and P ∗2 = P¯2
if h2 < 1 + h2P¯1. These cases correspond to h1 < 1 and
h1 < 1+h2P¯2, respectively. Thus, we have (72) as the secrecy
sum-rate maximizing power allocation.
Remark 3: Observe that the solution in Theorem 4 has a
structure similar to that in Theorem 3. In summary, it is
seen that as long as a user is not single-user decodable, it
should be transmitting with maximum power. Hence, when
both users can be made to be non-single-user decodable, then
the maximum powers will provide the largest secrecy sum-
rate. If this is not the case, then the user who is single-user
decodable cannot transmit with non-zero secrecy and will just
make the secrecy sum-rate constraint tighter for the remaining
user by transmitting open messages.
Comparing (72) to (67), we see that the same form of
solutions is found, but the range of channel gains where
transmission is possible is larger, showing that GTW-WT
allows secrecy even when the eavesdropper’s channel is not
very weak.
V. SECRECY THROUGH COOPERATIVE JAMMING
In the previous section, we found the secrecy sum-rate
maximizing power allocations. For both the GGMAC-WT and
GTW-WT, if the eavesdropper is not “disadvantaged enough”
for some users, then these users’ transmit powers are set
to zero. We posit that such a user may be able to “help”
a transmitting user, since it can cause more harm to the
eavesdropper than to the intended receiver. We only consider
the superposition region, since in the TDMA region a user has
a dedicated time-slot, and hence does not affect the others.
We will next show that this type of cooperative behavior is
indeed useful, notably exploiting the fact that the established
achievable secrecy sum-rate is a difference of the sum-capacity
expressions for the intended channel(s) and the eavesdropper’s
channel. As a result, reducing the latter more than the former
actually results in an increase in the achievable secrecy sum-
rate.
Formally, the scheme we are considering implies partition-
ing the set of users, K into a set of transmitting users, T and a
set of jamming users T c = K−T . If a user k is jamming, then
it transmits Xk ∼ N (P ∗k I,0) instead of codewords. In this
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case, we can show that we can achieve higher secrecy rates
when the “weaker” users are jamming. We also show that
the GTW-WT, has an additional advantage compared to the
GGMAC-WT, that is the fact that the receiver already knows
the jamming sequence. As such, this scheme only harms the
eavesdropper and not the intended receivers, achieving an
even higher secrecy sum-rate. Once again, without loss of
generality, we consider h1 < . . . < hK . In addition, we will
assume that a user can either take the action of transmitting
its information or jamming the eavesdropper, but not both. It
is readily shown in Section V-A below that we do not lose
any generality by doing so, and that splitting the power of a
user between the two actions is suboptimal from the secrecy
sum-rate maximization point of view.
A. GGMAC-WT
The problem is formally presented below:
max
T ⊆K,P∈P
1
2
[
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈T Pk
1 +
∑
k∈T c Pk
)
− log
(
1 +
∑
k∈T hkPk
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkPk
)]
(76)
≡ min
T ⊆K,P∈P
φK(P)
φT c(P)
(77)
where we recall that φS(P) is given by (59), such that
φK(P) =
1 +
∑
k∈K hkPk
1 +
∑
k∈K Pk
(78)
φT c(P) =
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkPk
1 +
∑
k∈T c Pk
. (79)
To see that a user should not be splitting its power among
jamming and transmitting, it is sufficient to note that regardless
of how a user splits its power, φK(P) will be the same, and
the user only affects φT c(P). Assume the optimum solution
is such that user j splits its power, so j ∈ T and j ∈ T c.
Then, it is easy to see that if hj < φT c(P∗), the sum-rate is
increased when that user uses its jamming power to transmit,
and when hj > φT c(P∗), the sum-rate is increased when the
user uses its transmit power to jam. When hj = φT c(P∗),
then regardless of how its power is split, the sum-rate is the
same, and we can assume user j either transmits or jams.
Note that we must have φK(P) ≤ φT c(P) to have a non-
zero secrecy sum-rate, and φT c(P) > 1 to have an advantage
over not jamming. This scheme can be shown to achieve the
following secrecy sum-rate:
Theorem 5: The secrecy sum-rate using cooperative jam-
ming is
RSUP-MA-CJsum =
1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈T P
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c P
∗
k
)
− 1
2
log
(
1 +
∑
k∈T hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k
)
(80)
where T is the set of transmitters and the optimum power
allocation is of the form
{1, . . . , T︸ ︷︷ ︸
P∗=P¯
, T + 1, . . . , J − 1︸ ︷︷ ︸
P∗=0︸ ︷︷ ︸
transmitting, i.e.,∈T
, J︸︷︷︸
P∗
J
, J + 1, . . . ,K︸ ︷︷ ︸
P∗=P¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
jamming, i.e.,∈T c
}
with
P ∗J =
[
min
{
P¯J ,
−c2 +
√
c22 − 4c1c3
2c1
}]+
(81)
and
c1=hJ
(
hJ
∑
k∈T
P ∗k −
∑
k∈T
hkP
∗
k
)
(82)
c2=hJ
(
2+
∑
k∈K\J
hkP
∗
k+
∑
k∈T c\J
hkP
∗
k
)∑
k∈T
P ∗k
− hJ
(
2+
∑
k∈K\J
P ∗k+
∑
k∈T c\J
P ∗k
)∑
k∈T
hkP
∗
k (83)
c3=
(
1+
∑
k∈K\J
hkP
∗
k
)(
1+
∑
k∈T c\J
hkP
∗
k
)∑
k∈T
P ∗k
− hJ
(
1+
∑
k∈K\J
P ∗k
)(
1+
∑
k∈T c\J
P ∗k
)∑
k∈T
hkP
∗
k (84)
whenever the positive real root exists, and 0 otherwise.
Proof: We first solve the subproblem of finding the
optimal power allocation for a set of given transmitters, T .
The solution to this will also give us insight into the structure
of the optimal set of transmitters, T ∗. We start with writing
the Lagrangian:
L(P,µ) = φK(P)
φT c(P)
−
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk +
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk − P¯k). (85)
The derivative of the Lagrangian depends on the user:
0=
∂L(P∗,µ)
∂P ∗j
=


φ˙
(j)
K
(P∗)
φT c (P∗)
− µ1j + µ2j , if j∈T
φ˙
(j)
K
(P∗)φT c (P
∗)−φK(P
∗)φ˙
(j)
T c
(P∗)
φ2
T c
(P∗)
+ µ2j , if j∈T c
(86)
since a user j ∈ T c satisfies P ∗j > 0, it must have µ1j = 0.
Consider a user j ∈ T . The same argument as in the sum-
rate maximization proof leads to P ∗j = P¯j if hj < φK(P∗)
and P ∗1 = 0 if hj ≥ φK(P∗). Now examine a user j ∈ T c.
We can write (86) as
ρj(P
∗)(
1 +
∑
k∈K Pk
)2 (
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkPk
)2 + µ2j = 0 (87)
where
ρj(P) , −hj
(
1+
∑
k∈K
Pk
)(
1+
∑
k∈T c
Pk
)∑
k∈T
hkPk
+
(
1+
∑
k∈K
hkPk
)(
1+
∑
k∈T c
hkPk
)∑
k∈T
Pk. (88)
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Let
ΦT (P) , φK(P)φT c(P)
∑
k∈T Pk∑
k∈T hkPk
. (89)
Then, we have ρj(P) ≤ 0 iff hj ≥ ΦT (P), and ρj(P) ≥
0 iff hj ≤ ΦT (P). Thus, we again find that we must have
hj ≥ ΦT (P∗) for all j ∈ T c. Also, if hj > ΦT (P∗), then
P ∗j = P¯j . Only if hj = ΦT (P∗), can we have 0 < P ∗j < P¯j .
Now, since φT c(P∗)≥φK(P∗), we must have φT c(P∗) ≥
φK(P
∗) ≥ (∑k∈T hkP ∗k ) / (∑k∈T P ∗k ). Thus, we find that
ΦT (P
∗) ≥ φK(P∗). Then, we know that for a given set of
transmitters, T , the solution is such that all users j ∈ T
transmit with power P¯j if hj ≤ φK(P∗). In the set of jammers
T c, all users have hj ≥ ΦT (P∗) ≥ φT c(P∗) ≥ φK(P∗), and
when this inequality is not satisfied with equality, the jammers
jam with maximum power. If the equality is satisfied for some
users j, their jamming powers can be found from solving
hj = ΦT (P
∗). By rearranging terms in (88), we note that
the optimum power allocation for this user, call it user J , is
found by solving the quadratic
ρJ(P
∗) = c1P
∗
J
2 + c2P
∗
J + c3 = 0 (90)
the solution of which is given in (81).
Note that (90) defines an (upright) parabola. If the root given
in (90) exists and is positive, then P ∗J = min
{
P¯j , P
∗
J
}
. This
comes from the fact that if P ∗J > P¯J , then ρJ(P) < 0 for
all 0 < PJ < P¯J , and we must have µ2J > 0. If, on the
other hand, (90) gives a complex or negative solution, then
the parabola does not intersect the PJ axis, and is always
positive. Hence, hJ < ΦT ∗(P∗), and J does not belong to
T c, i.e. P ∗J = 0.
The form of this solution is intuitively pleasing, since it
makes more sense for “weaker” users to jam as they harm the
eavesdropper more than they do the intended receiver. What
we see is that all transmitting users j, such that P ∗j > 0,
transmit with maximum power as long as their standardized
channel gain hj is less than some limit φK(P∗), and all
jamming users must have hj > φK(P∗).
We claim that all users in T ∗ must have hj < ΦT (P∗) and
all users in T ∗c have hj ≥ ΦT (P∗). To make this argument,
we need to show that a T such that there exists some m ∈ T
with P ∗m = 0 and n ∈ T c such that hm > hn cannot be
the optimum set. To see this, let P∗ be the optimum power
allocation for a set T . Consider a new power allocation and
set such that U = T \ {m}, i.e., user m is now jamming, and
let Qk = P ∗k , ∀k 6= m,n, Qm = π and Qn = P ∗n − π, for
some small π. We then have
φK(Q)
φUc(Q)
=
1 +
∑
k∈K hkQk
1 +
∑
k∈KQk
1 +
∑
k∈Uc hkQk
1 +
∑
k∈Uc Qk
(91)
=
1 +
∑
k∈K hkP
∗
k + (hm − hn)π
1 +
∑
k∈K P
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k + (hm − hn)π
1 +
∑
k∈T c P
∗
k
(92)
<
1 +
∑
k∈K hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈K P
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k
1 +
∑
k∈T c P
∗
k
(93)
=
φK(P
∗)
φT c(P∗)
(94)
which is a lower value for the objective function, proving that
(T ,P∗) is not optimum. This shows that all users j ∈ T ∗c
must have hj > hk for all users k ∈ T ∗. Since the last user
in T ∗c has hj = ΦT (P∗), necessarily hj ≥ ΦT (P∗) for all
j ∈ T ∗c, and hj < ΦT (P∗) for all j ∈ T ∗.
Summarizing, the optimum power allocation is such that
there is a set of transmitting users {1, . . . , T} with P ∗k = P¯k
for k = 1, . . . , l, there is a set of silent users {T+1, . . . , J−1},
and a set of jamming users {J, . . . ,K} with P ∗k = P¯k for
k = J +1, . . . ,K and P ∗J is found from hJ = ΦT (P∗). This
is what is presented in the statement in Theorem 5.
Note that to find T, J , we can simply do an exhaustive
search as we have narrowed the number of possible optimal
sets to K(K − 1) instead of 2K − 1 and found the optimal
power allocations for each.
Two-user GGMAC-WT:
For illustration purposes, let us consider the familiar case
with K = 2 transmitters. In this case, we know that either
user 2 jams, or no user does. The solution can be found from
comparing the two cases. If, without jamming, user 2 can
transmit, then it is optimal for it to continue to transmit, and
jamming will not improve the sum-rate. Otherwise, user 2 may
be jamming to improve the secrecy rate of user 1.
The optimum power allocation for user 1 is equivalent to
P ∗1 = P¯ if h1 < φK(P∗) and P ∗1 = 0 if h1 ≥ φK(P∗).
The power for user 2 is found from (81). For 2 users, we can
simply write (90) as
P ∗1 h2(h2 − h1)(P ∗2 − p)(P ∗2 − p¯) = 0 (95)
where
p =
−h2(1− h1) +
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) , (96)
p¯ =
−h2(1− h1)−
√
D
h2(h2 − h1) (97)
D = h1h2(h2 − 1)[(h2 − 1) + (h2 − h1)P ∗1 ]. (98)
If h1 < 1, we automatically have P ∗1 = P¯ . In addition,
we have p¯ < 0, so we only need to concern ourselves with
the possibly positive root, p. We first find when P ∗2 = 0.
We see that ρ2(P) ≥ 0 for all P ∈ P if p < 0, equivalent
to having two negative roots, or D < 0 ⇒ h2 ≤ φ1(P¯ ),
equivalent to having no real roots of ρ2(P). Now examine
when 0 < P ∗2 < P¯ . This is possible if and only if ρ2(P∗) = 0.
Since P ∗1 > 0, this happens only when h1 = h2 or P ∗2 = p >
0. However, if h1 = h2, we are better off transmitting than
jamming. The last case to examine is when P ∗2 = P¯ . This
implies that ρ2(P¯) < 0, and is satisfied when p > P¯2.
Assume h2 > h1 ≥ 1. In this case, we are guaranteed
p ≥ 0. If P ∗1 = 0, then we must have P ∗2 = 0 since the
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Fig. 7. GGMAC-WT cooperative jamming secrecy sum-rate as a
function of P2 with different h1 for P¯1 = P¯2 = 2, h2 = 1.4. The
circles indicate optimum jamming power.
secrecy rate is 0. We would like to find when we can have
P ∗1 > 0. Since h1 < φ2(P ∗2 ), we must have P ∗2 > h1−1h2−h1 ≥ 0,
and ρ2(P¯ , P ∗2 ) ≤ 0. This implies p¯ ≤ P ∗2 ≤ p. It is easy to see
that P ∗2 = min
{
p, P¯
}
if h1−1
h2−h1
< min
{
p, P¯2
}
and P ∗2 = 0
otherwise.
Thus, for K = 2 users, the solution simplifies to:
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ) =

(P¯1, 0), if h1≤1, 1+h1P¯11+P¯1 ≤h2 ≤ 1
(P¯1,
[
min
{
p, P¯2
}]+
), if h1≤1, h2>1
(0, 0), if h1≥1, h2≥h1, h1−1h2−h1≥P¯1
(P¯1,min
{
p, P¯2
}
), if h1≥1, h2>h1, h1−1h2−h1<P¯1
(99)
where
p =
h1−1
h2−h1 +
√
h1h2(h2−1)
[
(h2−1)+(h2−h1)P¯1
]
h2(h2−h1) . (100)
This solution can be checked to be in accordance with the
sum-rate maximizing power allocation of Theorem 3. We note
that in the case unaccounted for in (99), i.e., when h1 ≤ 1 and
h2 ≤ 1+h1P¯11+P¯1 , both users should be transmitting. In general,
the solution shows that the “weaker” user should jam if it is
not single-user decodable, and if it has enough power to make
the other user “strong” in the new effective channel.
B. GTW-WT
Once again, we propose to maximize the secrecy sum-
rate using cooperative jamming when useful. This problem
is formally stated as follows:
max
T ⊆K,
P∈P
1
2
[∑
k∈T
log (Pk)− log
(
1+
∑
k∈T hkPk
1+
∑
k∈T c hkPk
)]
≡ min
T ⊆K
min
P∈P¯
ψK(P)
ψT c(P)
(101)
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Fig. 8. GGMAC-WT cooperative jamming secrecy sum-rate as a
function of P2 with different h1 for P¯1 = P¯2 = 100, h2 = 1.4. The
circles indicate optimum jamming power.
where we recall that ψS(P) is given by (71) and
ψK(P) =
1 +
∑
k∈K hkPk∏
k∈K(1 + Pk)
(102)
ψT c(P) =
1 +
∑
k∈T c hkPk∏
k∈T c(1 + Pk)
. (103)
Note that K = {1, 2} since there are only two terminals. A
similar argument to the GGMAC-WT case can easily be used
to establish that we can assume a user to be either transmitting
or jamming, but not both. Since the jamming user is also the
receiver that the other user is communicating with and knows
the transmitted signal, this scheme entails no loss of capacity
as far as the transmitting user is concerned. The optimum
power allocations are given as follows.
Theorem 6: The achievable secrecy sum-rate for the the
collaborative scheme described is
RTW-CJsum=
∑
k∈T
1
2
log (P ∗k )−
1
2
log
(
1+
∑
k∈T hkP
∗
k
1+
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k
)
(104)
where T is the set of transmitting users and the optimum
power allocations are given by
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ) =

(P¯1, P¯2), both transmit, if h1<h2≤1
(P¯1, P¯2), 1 transm., 2 jams, if h1≤1<h2
(P¯1, P¯2), 1 transm., 2 jams, if 1<h1<1+h2P¯2,
ψ2(P¯)>ψ1(P¯)
(P¯1, P¯2), 2 transm., 1 jams, if 1<h1<h2<1+h1P¯1,
ψ1(P¯)>ψ2(P¯)
(0, 0), otherwise
(105)
Proof: Similar to the GGMAC-WT, we start with the
sub-problem of finding the optimal power allocation given a
jamming set. The Lagrangian is given by
L(P,µ) = ψK(P)
ψT c(P)
−
2∑
k=1
µ1kPk+
2∑
k=1
µ2k(Pk− P¯k). (106)
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Fig. 9. GTW-WT cooperative jamming secrecy sum-rate as a function
of P2 with different h1 for P¯1 = P¯2 = 2, h2 = 4.2.
Taking the derivative we have
0=
∂L(P∗,µ)
∂P ∗j
=


ψ˙
(j)
K
(P∗)
ψT c (P∗)
− µ1j + µ2j , if j∈T
ψ˙
(j)
K
(P∗)ψT c (P
∗)−ψK(P
∗)ψ˙
(j)
T c
(P∗)
ψ2
T c
(P∗)
+ µ2j , if j∈T c
(107)
since a user j ∈ T c satisfies P ∗j > 0, it must have µ1j = 0.
Consider user j ∈ T . We again argue that if hj >
1+
∑
k∈K
hkPk
1+Pj
, then P ∗j = 0 and if hj <
1+
∑
k∈K
hkPk
1+Pj
, then
P ∗j = P¯j .
Now examine a user j ∈ T c. It is easy to see that since such
a user only harms the jammer, the optimal jamming strategy
should have P ∗j = P¯j , i.e., the maximum power. This can also
be seen by noting that (107) for this case simplifies to
−hj
∑
k∈T hkP
∗
k(
1+
∑
k∈T c hkP
∗
k
)2 (∏
k∈K(1+P
∗
k )
)2 + µ2j = 0 (108)
and hence we must have µ2j > 0⇒ P ∗j = P¯j for all j ∈ T c.
The jamming set will be one of ∅, {1}, {2}, since there is no
point in jamming when there is no transmission. Also, if any
of the two users is jamming, by the argument above, P ∗j = P¯j ,
j = 1, 2.
We can easily see that jamming by a user j only offers an
advantage if hj > 1, i.e., ψT c(P) > 1 iff hj > 1 for j ∈ T c.
Thus, when h1 < h2 ≤ 1, both users should be transmitting
instead of jamming. However, when any user has hj > 1,
jamming always does better than the case when both users
are transmitting. In this case, ψj(P¯) ≥ ψjc(P¯) for some user
j, and the objective function in (101) is minimized when this
user is jamming, and the other one is transmitting. If, however,
hjc > 1 + hjP¯j , then it will not transmit, and we should not
be jamming. Consolidating all of these results, we come up
with the power allocation in in Theorem 6.
Remark 4: A sufficient, but not necessary condition for the
weaker user to be the jamming user is if h2P¯2 > h1P¯1; this
case corresponds to having higher SNR at the eavesdropper for
the original, non-standardized model. This can be interpreted
as “jam with maximum power if it is possible to change user
1’s effective channel gain such that it is no longer single-user
decodable”. For the simple case of equal power constraints,
P¯1 = P¯2 = P¯ , it is easily seen that user 1 should never be
jamming. The optimal power allocation in that case reduces
to
(P ∗1 , P
∗
2 ) =

(P¯ , P¯ ), both transmit, if h1 < h2 ≤ 1
(P¯ , P¯ ), 1 transmits, 2 jams, if h1 < 1 + h2P¯
(0, 0), otherwise
(109)
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS
In this section, we present numerical results to illustrate the
achievable rates obtained, as well as the cooperative jamming
scheme and its effect on achievable secrecy sum-rates.
As mentioned earlier in the paper, examples of achievable
secrecy rate regions are given in Figures 4 and 6 for the
GGMAC-WT with K = 2 and GTW-WT respectively. Com-
paring Figures 4 and 6, we see that the GTW-WT achieves
a larger secrecy rate region then the GGMAC-WT, and offers
more protection to “weak” users. In addition, TDMA does not
enlarge the achievable region for GTW-WT since superposi-
tion coding always allows users to achieve their single-user
secrecy rates for any transmit power.
Let us have a closer look at the secrecy advantage of
the two-way channel over the MAC with two users. For the
GGMAC-WT with K = 2, the achievable maximum secrecy
sum-rate, Rs1+R
s
2 is limited by the channel parameters. It was
shown in [41] that for the degraded case, h ≤ 1, the secrecy
sum-capacity, CMK(P) − CWK(P), is an increasing function of
the total sum power, P¯Σ = P¯1 + P¯2. However, it is limited
since CMK(P) − CWK(P) → − 12 log h as P¯Σ → ∞. For the
general case, where P¯1, P¯2 →∞, Theorem 3 implies that the
sum-rate is maximized when only user 1 transmits (assuming
h2 > h1), and is bounded similarly by − 12 log h1. On the
other hand, For the GTW-WT, unlike the GGMAC-WT, it is
possible to increase the secrecy capacity by increasing the
transmit powers. This mainly stems from the fact that the
users now have the extra advantage over the eavesdropper
that they know their own transmitted codewords. In effect,
each user helps encrypt the other user’s transmission. To
see this more clearly, consider the symmetric case where
α1 = α2 = h1 = h2 = 1 and P¯1 = P¯2 = P¯ , which
makes all users receive a similarly noisy version of the same
sum-message. The only disadvantage the eavesdropper has, is
that he does not know any of the codewords whereas user k
knows Xk. In this case, Rs1+Rs2 ≤ 12 log
(
1 + P¯ 2/(1 + 2P¯ )
)
is achievable, and this rate approaches 12 log(
1
2 P¯ ) as P¯ ≫ 1.
Thus, it is possible to achieve a secrecy-rate increase at the
same rate as the increase in channel capacity.
Next, we examine the secrecy sum-rate maximizing power
allocations and optimum powers for the cooperative jamming
scheme. Figures 7 and 8 show the achievable secrecy rate
improvement for the cooperative jamming scheme for various
channel parameters for the GGMAC-WT with K = 2. The
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Fig. 10. GGMAC-WT cooperative jamming example - darker shades
correspond to higher values.
plots are the secrecy rates for user 1 when user 2 is jamming
with a given power, which correspond to user 1’s single-user
secrecy capacity, [14], since only one user is transmitting.
When h1 ≥ 1, the secrecy capacity is seen to be zero, unless
user 2 has enough power to convert user 1’s re-standardized
channel gain to less than 1. For the GTW-WT, it is always
optimal for user 2 to jam as long as it enables user 1 to
transmit, as seen in Figure 9. The results show, as expected,
that secrecy is achievable for both users so long as we can keep
the eavesdropper from single-user decoding the transmitted
codewords by treating the remaining user as noise.
Since the coding schemes considered here assume knowl-
edge of eavesdropper’s channel gains, applications are limited.
One practical application could be securing of a physically
protected area such as inside a building, when the eavesdrop-
per is known to be outside. In such a case we can design
for the worst case scenario. An example is given in Figure
10 for the GGMAC-WT, where we assume a simple path-
loss model and fixed locations for two transmitters (T) and
one receiver (R) at the center. We examine the transmit/jam
powers for this area when the eavesdropper is known to be at
(x, y) using a fixed path-loss model for the channel gains, and
plot the transmit/jam powers and the achieved secrecy sum-
rates as a function of the eavesdropper location. It is readily
seen that when the eavesdropper is close to the BS, the secrecy
sum-rate falls to zero. Also, when the eavesdropper is in the
vicinity of a transmitter, that transmitter cannot transmit in
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Fig. 11. GTW-WT cooperative jamming example - darker shades
correspond to higher values.
secrecy. However, in this case, the transmitter can jam the
eavesdropper effectively, and allow the other transmitter to
transmit and/or increase its secrecy rate with little jamming
power. The situation for the GTW-WT is similar, and is shown
in Figure 11. In this case, jamming is more useful as compared
to the GGMAC-WT, and we see that it is possible to provide
secrecy for a much larger area where the eavesdropper is
located, as the jamming signal does not hurt the intended
receiver.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper, we have considered the Gaussian multiple
access and two-way channels in the presence of an external
eavesdropper who receives the transmitted signals through
a multiple-access channel, and provided achievable secrecy
rates. We have shown that the multiple-access nature of the
channels considered can be utilized to improve the secrecy
of the system. In particular, we have shown that the total
extra randomness is what matters mainly concerning the
eavesdropper, rather than the individual randomness in the
codes. As such, it may possible for users whose single-user
wire-tap capacity are zero, to communicate with non-zero
secrecy rate, as long as it is possible to put the eavesdropper
at an overall disadvantage. This is even clearer for two-way
channels, where even though the eavesdropper’s channel gain
may be better than a terminal’s, the extra knowledge of its own
codeword by that terminal enables communication in perfect
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secrecy as long as the eavesdropper’s received signal is not
strong enough to allow single-user decoding.
We found achievable secrecy rate regions for the General
Gaussian Multiple-Access Wire-Tap Channel (GGMAC-WT)
and the Gaussian Two-Way Wire-Tap Channel (GTW-WT).
We also showed that for the GGMAC-WT the secrecy sum-
rate is maximized when only users with ‘strong” channels to
the intended receiver as opposed to the eavesdropper transmit,
and they do so using all their available power. For the GTW-
WT, the sum-rate is maximized when both terminals transmit
with maximum power as long as the eavesdropper’s channel is
not good enough to decode them using single-user decoding.
Finally, we proposed a scheme termed cooperative jamming,
where a disadvantaged user may help improve the secrecy rate
by jamming the eavesdropper. We found the optimum power
allocations for the transmitting and jamming users, and showed
that significant rate gains may be achieved, especially when
the eavesdropper has much higher SNR than the receivers and
normal secret communications is not possible. The gains can
be significant for both the GGMAC-WT and GTW-WT. This
cooperative behavior is useful when the maximum secrecy
sum-rate is of interest. We have also contrasted the secrecy
rates of the two channels we considered, noting the benefit
of the two-way channels where the fact that each receiver has
perfect knowledge of its transmitted signal brings an advantage
with each user effectively encrypting the communications of
the other user.
In this paper, we only presented achievable secrecy rates
for the GGMAC-WT and GTW-WT. The secrecy capacity
region for these channels are still open problems. In [45],
we also found an upper bound for the secrecy sum-rate of
the GGMAC-WT and noted that the achievable secrecy sum-
rate and the upper bound we found only coincide for the
degraded case, so that we have the secrecy sum-capacity
for the degraded GMAC-WT. Even though there is a gap
between the achievable secrecy sum-rates and upper bounds,
cooperative jamming was shown in [45] to give a secrecy sum-
rate that is close to the upper bound in general.
Finally, we note that the results provided are of mainly
theoretical interest, since as of yet there are no currently known
practical codes for multi-access wire-tap channels unlike the
single-user case where in some cases practical codes have
been shown to be useful for the wire-tap channel, [46], [47].
Furthermore, accurate estimates of the eavesdropper channel
parameters are required for code design for wire-tap channels
where the channel model is quasi-static, as in our models
considered in this paper.
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